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This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the attractions and 
disadvantages of fixed exchange rates and currency board 
arrangements (CBA) principally drawing on the experience of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It assesses merits and costs related to 
this arrangement, primarily looking at the rigidities and constraints 
the regime imposes on macroeconomic policies, and the subsequent 
impact on growth and development. Finally, the paper elaborates if 
and under which conditions, the weaknesses associated with the 
regime are off set with its repeatedly assigned advantages of i.e. 
macroeconomic stability, low inflation, increased confidence and 
established credibility as well as reduced “costs” to business 
transactions and investments. The paper concludes that Bosnian 
currency board was viable temporary solution and that serious 
consideration shall be given to exiting the regime.  
JEL classification: F31 




In the last decade there has been considerable discussion on what 
exchange rate policies shall be pursued by developing countries as 
well as countries in transition as mean of successful transformation 
and effective mechanism to economic restructuring, private sector 
growth and promoted stability. The central to this, rather broad and 
growing debate, has been the role of fixed exchange rates, and the 
currency board arrangements (CBA) in particular. Currency board 
arrangements have recently undergone a revival, resulting in an 
increasing concern of economists and policy makers about the 
benefits and costs of currency boards. Eventually, they have been 
introduced in this decade in Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
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inclusive of Bosnia and Herzegovina and have been proposed for 
number of other countries. The Currency Board in BH operates since 
1997 and has, just as in many other countries, played a significant 
role in the country’s overall stabilization. Notwithstanding these 
benefits the critical issue is not retrospective in nature, i.e. was the 
currency board a right option and what benefits has it brought? On 
the contrary, the critical issue is the current sustainability of the 
regime. Is it a right policy that would lead Bosnia to a sustainable 
development path and integration into the EU? If not what is the 
alternative policy, and could it possibly be pursued in the time to 
come? This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
attractions and disadvantages of such arrangements principally 
drawing on the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The 
first part of the paper assesses general merits and costs related to this 
arrangement, primarily looking at the rigidities and constraints the 
regime imposes on macroeconomic policies. In regard, the first part 
provides dispersed concluding remarks in regard to when and under 
which conditions, the weaknesses associated with the regime are off 
set with its repeatedly assigned advantages of i.e. macroeconomic 
stability, low inflation, increased confidence and established 
credibility as well as reduced “costs” to business transactions and 
investments.  The second part of the paper however, studies currency 
board regime in Bosnia, its historical evolution and accomplish-
ments. Brief assessment of the reasons for adopting and nature of 
currency board operating is provided as basis for succeeding detailed 
analysis of the regime. The third part of the paper, however, provides 
comprehensive analysis related to currency board sustainability, 
issues and controversies. Thus risks and costs related to continued 
adherence of currency board option are thoughtfully elaborated 
considering economies internal and external imbalances and future 
macroeconomic prospects. The concluding remarks follow.  The 
conclusion lay down that the country has entered currency board trap 
and that domestic and international policy makers shall no longer 
hesitate to abandon the regime. 
 
2.  The currency board regime: merits and costs.  
2.1 What is the currency board and how it operates? The currency 
board arrangement is an extraordinary rule-based monetary system, 
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which operates strictly in accordance to the rules rather than 
discretion. In its simplest form it may be defined as monetary regime 
based on explicit legislative commitment to exchange the domestic 
currency at a given parity. This concept implies that monetary 
authorities are legally obliged to ensure that the currency can be 
issued only against foreign exchange and that it remains fully backed 
by foreign assets. The rigidity of the regime is thus seen in 
authority’s commitment to restricted or even eliminated use of key 
monetary policy instruments aimed to influence both financial and 
money market dynamics. Thus, traditional functions of central bank 
such as monetary regulation i.e. interest rate and inflation policy 
targeting, and the most essential function of Lender of Last Resort 
(LOLR) aren’t permitted under this monetary structure. However, the 
central bank can still give credit to governments and commercial 
banks or even undertake other monetary operations provided that it 
holds foreign reserves in excess to what is needed to fully cover 
monetary base. In the Annex A1 other features of this system are 
analyzed. 
2.2 Why opt for currency board arrangement? In line with above 
elaborated currency board characteristics and its operating features, 
its seem obvious even though controversial, that the currency board 
essential merits stem directly form rigidities it imposes on monetary 
and fiscal authorities.  In other words, the rules that eliminate or at 
best severely limit the scope of discretion in monetary and exchange 
rate policies enhance confidence in the respective authorities as well 
as financial- and banking sector in particular.  The currency board 
arrangements are thus accredited with better macroeconomic 
performance reflected in better inflation as well as growth 
performances, even if compared to countries operating fixed 
exchange rate regimes (A.Ghosh, A.Gulde and H. Wolf, 1998). 
Nonetheless it is primarily the strict legal provisions and barriers 
which prevent any political abuse and easing of the policy rules at 
the expense of monetary and macroeconomic stability, which makes 
a considerable distinction between the currency board and any other 
form of fixed parity regime. This in return, raises confidence of both 
local and international investors in exchange rate parity, 
macroeconomic stability and banking sector stability, but also may 
substantially promote both financial and trade integration with the 
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reserve country/region, in particular. Further, the empirical evidence 
suggest that the currency boards have made and essential 
contribution to the stabilization programs in number of countries i.e. 
in Argentina immediately after the introduction in 1991 the inflation 
rate has stabilized thus coming down from about 10 000% in 1990 to 
below 5% in 1994 and continued to decrease in the following years, 
also in Estonia and Lithuania despite the preserved two-digits 
inflation rate throughout the transition period, the inflation rate was 
substantially brought  down i.e. in Estonia from the levels of about 
1000 % in 1992 dawn to below 40% already a year after the 
introduction of currency board. 
1 In addition to monetary and fiscal 
soundness, which induce stabilization, most countries experience 
strong economic recoveries after the stabilization period often due to 
remarkable growth in private sector investments and huge foreign 
capital inflows. In return, surge in private capital inflows associated 
with most of the currency board countries with the exception of 
Bosnia, in particular, result in increased broad money but also in an 
increased and risky reliance on foreign capital assets.  In accordance 
to the theoretical premises assigned to the fixed exchange rate 
regimes, currency board tends to induce interest rate stabilization and 
convergence in most countries. In spite of usually prevailing 
differences in inters rate parities between the domestic and the 
anchor country and thus, quite high disparities persisting over a quite 
long period such as in Argentina throughout the whole currency 
board period, interest rate do tend to stabilize if compared to the 
period prior to the adoption (Tomas J.T. Balino and Charles Enoch 
1997). A complementary analysis of this question is included in 
Annex A2. This article explores on outstanding issues and 
controversies related to the regime in general and the specificities 
Bosnian experience. Final argumentation in Bosnian case assessment 
goes in favor of currency board exiting from the position of relative 
strength as opposed to reasonable problems and credibility discretion 
in due course.  
2.3 What are the weaknesses and costs of the currency board 
regime? Controversially the weaknesses of the regime can be derived 
                                                 
1  Balino and Enoch. (1997), pp 8-9 
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from its main strengths, depending on the nature of arguments as 
much as on specific conditions of domestic economy. First, it is 
exactly the nominal exchange rate rigidity, which may pose too 
much risk to regimes sustainability in case of high and continuous 
real exchange rate misalignments. The problems associated with real 
exchange rate fluctuations are not marginal, and can become a 
burden and even source of discredit.  In effect, the commitment to 
attain nominal exchange rate parity is often difficult to attain due to 
persistent differences in price fluctuations, and thus may come at 
high costs.  Therefore the decision as to what is the proper exchange 
rate parity and what shall be the reserve currency or set of currencies 
is of essential importance. However, having a reasonable perception 
about the appropriateness regarding the mentioned decisions is not a 
clear cut.  On the contrary the mistakes in this respect would come at 
high cost, and high real exchange rate fluctuations may incur costs of 
loss of credibility already at the early stages. Also, following wrong 
macroeconomic policies of the anchor country may be counter-
productive and come at odds with domestic economy performance 
objectives. In other words, wrong choice on anchor currency or set of 
currencies may have a negative effect on trade account, thus further 
inducing policy misalignments. Notwithstanding these theoretical 
premises, the empirical evidence shows that most of the exchange-
rate stabilization programs have experienced booming economic 
performance and real exchange rate appreciation. More details on 
this question are presented in Annex A3. 
The experience of CBA (Currency Board Arrangement) countries 
suggest that capital flows and interest rate arbitrage may be 
ineffective and cannot serve as substitute for central bank liquidity 
management, causing constant liquidity mismatches and penalizing 
financial transactions. Particularly, specific credit and country risk as 
well as doubts on the regimes sustainability may be reflected in 
different risk proxies such as differences in passive interest rates for 
domestic and anchor currency, massive reserve currency 
denominated credits, short-term loans maturity, as well as explicit 
country risk rate added to the real interest rates. For instance, due to 
persistent short-term liquidity imbalances CBA countries strive to 
build up excess international reserves as to engage actively in open 
market operations i.e. Argentina, Hong-Kong, Estonia. This implies, 
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however, that the countries incapable of excess reserve asset 
accumulation would face serious problems mitigating the negative 
effects of imposed restrictions. Unfortunately, the Bosnia is the pure 
example of the elaborated problems and associated costs on growth 
performance and high unemployment rate.  
 
3. The evolution and nature of currency board in BIH. 
3.1 The BiH Controversial Political Context Four years of war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was brought to en end by Dayton 
Peace Agreement in December 1995. This established BH as a single 
sovereign country divided into two Entities: the Serb controlled 
Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosniac/Croat controlled Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH). The Dayton Accord has produced 
highly decentralized state structure, with central state institutions 
having very limited power, its role being limited to the bare 
minimum necessary for BH to be considered a single sovereign 
country (foreign policy, international trade and debt, monetary 
policy, immigration, international low enforcement, and air traffic 
control), plus relations between the Entities (inter-entity transport, 
communications and low enforcement). The Entities have 
responsibility across a much broader range of issues, including many 
which are more commonly (or even exclusively) held by national 
governments. These include: internal affairs, policing and justice; 
taxation and custom administration; agriculture, energy, industry and 
other economic policies; health and social policies; environmental 
policies, refugees and displaced persons and reconstruction 
programs. Embarking on a course of post-war reconstruction, 
political reconciliation and a transition from state controlled to 
market economy, was not, and still isn’t, an easy task, particularly 
considering the need for coordinated and consensus based reform 
decisions among the Entities. Therefore the political will and 
commitment to reforms and state institutions strengthening remain 
the key pillars to overall success and better future for BH citizens 
regardless of their ethnic roots and religious background. Eventually, 
despite the evident economic and political progress in the eight years 
aftermath of Dayton Accord, self-sustainability still presents a key 
challenge for BiH. Eight years after the war and $5 billion spent on 
post-war reconstruction and economic rehabilitation, achieving a 
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sustainable development path reveled in emancipation from poverty, 
raising living standards and increasing equality represent the 
essential issue the future BiH economic policies need to adequately 
address. BiH authorities strive to turn a currently aid-dependent 
economy into a one driven by free and stable market forces. In the 
course of this the current currency board arrangement presents one of 
the essential policy issues primarily because the regime on the whole 
determines the overall macroeconomic performance and the 
dynamics of growth, in particular. Yet, the key issue becomes if the 
CBA and the resulting policy misalignments has been the source of 
growth contraction and worrying macroeconomic performance in the 
last years? Further, an implicit question is the one of currency board 
sustainability considering the reverse trend and outstanding external 
vulnerability indicators in specific.   
 3.2 The Central Bank as Currency Board 
3.2.1 The legal and institutional framework of CBA. As noted earlier, 
macroeconomic policy for the whole of BiH is largely dictated by the 
requirement of the Dayton Agreement that the Central Bank should 
operate as a currency board for the first six years period of post-war 
reconstruction. The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(CBBH) was established in accordance with the Constitutional 
provision and respective Law on 20 June 1997.In December 2002 the 
monetary regime of the currency board has been prolonged for 
another medium-term period, decision valid until December 2006.  
The CBBH is and independent and sole authority in charge of 
establishing and supervision of monetary policy and monetary policy 
instruments, all according to the powers given to the Board by the 
Law.  The CBA in BiH presents one of the most extreme and rigid 
rules based system, the one which may be referred to as “pure” CBA 
in function. The BiH rules strictly imply that local currency can be 
issued only against the Central Bank’s holdings of foreign currency.  
Therefore, CBBH maintains monetary stability by issuing domestic 
currency only against the 100% coverage of base money, with at 
least 50% of backing in Euros.  . Currency board also means that the 
currency is convertible (i.e. there are no restrictions on buying or 
selling foreign currency), and that the exchange rate is fixed (at 1 
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KM to 0.51 €) with no possibility of adjusting it up or down.
2 
Moreover, the CBA framework prevents authorities from running a 
budget deficit, unless it is financed by foreign loans or grants, posing 
fiscal policy constraints. Minimum reserve requirement is 10%, 
indeed effective in lowering systematic risks but posing relatively 
tight liquidity conditions for the banking sector, and higher 
operational costs. 
3.2.2. The essential merits of CBA during reconstruction period 
Throughout the period the currency board has, just as in many other 
countries, played a significant role in the country’s overall 
stabilization. Considering both, overall political economic context of 
a post-conflict BiH, no doubt that the Currency Board has been the 
right or most probably the only viable policy choice. Indeed, it has 
been a prudent policy for the Bosnian economy as it has brought 
macroeconomic stability and increased overall credibility to 
monetary authorities and banking sector in particular. Thus, CB has 
served as successful tool for currency transition, form three 
currencies to single currency in use. Eventually, both citizens and 
private sector regained confidence in single state currency.  Also, the 
regime has played a most prominent role in political reconciliation 
and has contributed to strengthening of, and growing confidence in 
the state institutions. Notwithstanding these benefits the critical issue 
is not retrospective in nature, i.e. was the currency board a right 
option and what benefits has it brought? On the contrary, the critical 
issue is the current sustainability of the regime.. Is it a right policy 
that would lead Bosnia to a sustainable development path and 
integration into the EU? If not what is the alternative policy, and 
could it possibly be pursued in the time to come? Yet, in an attempt 
to assess the appropriateness of Bosnian Currency Board there are 
several issues that need to be carefully addressed: The issues 
reflecting internal and external balance i.e. REER, Unemployment 
and Growth, Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Accounts, Current Account and 
Public debt.  
                                                 
2 No adjustment of Exchange rate is allowed under this arrangement, and 
the exchange rate is fixed by law, Regulation Decree. 
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4. Assesment of appropriatnness and sustainability fo BIH CBA. 
4.1 Real Effective Exchange Rate Movements and Repercussions on 
Currency Board. As under the currency board arrangement, the 
exchange rate cannot be adjusted through nominal exchange rate 
movements, instead the real exchange rates adjust themselves 
through price changes. Thus, rather than an appreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate during the reconstruction phase, real 
exchange rate adjustment have taken place through price inflation. 
(See inflation rate Chart)
3 The International Monetary Fond 
estimates that for the first three years of reconstruction phase 1998-
2001, consequently, as the large-scale aid inflows increased the 
supply of foreign exchange a  real exchange rate appreciation has 
occurred and REER appreciated by about 17% (IMF staff estimates). 
This is not, in it self, a very serious problem. It was necessary as 
excess demand pushed up prices for non-tradable goods due to the 
surge in aid flows during the first reconstruction phase (until about 
2000). The real appreciation, reflected in price inflation, was, in 
effect, of marginal concern. This is because BiH economy has not 
reached its full capacity utilization, which in turn, had it been 
occurred would have imposed much higher inflation rates, as evident 
for other transition and currency board economies i.e. Lithuania and 
Estonia. However, as the reconstruction progresses, and the aid is 
winding dawn the effect is reversed. This, however, imposes much 
grater problems, since in order to achieve real depreciation, inflation 
would need to be lower than in the Euro zone (the currency is fixed 
against the Euro). Figures A1 and A2 in the Annex present, 
respectively, the evolution of inflation by one hand and the evolution 
of NEER and REER in BiH. 
This is exactly the trouble the BiH is facing today: a need to achieve 
real depreciation and correct for exchange rate misalignments. 
Eventually, the trend in the last two years has been reversed, and 
REER depreciated (See REER Chart) This in turn means that the 
domestic policies have been so deflationary, severely depressing 
output, increasing unemployment and reducing real incomes. 
However, the REER depreciation does not seem temporary as BiH 
                                                 
3 Source: CBBH 
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economy has not reached its external balance and thus, has extremely 
low level of private capital inflows. This situation and respective 
future prospects are indicative of continuing deflationary policy and, 
in fact, further employment of fiscal restriction measures, with 
inevitably reverse effect on the economic growth potential. Thus, 
these policies reveal an extremely high social costs, rising 
unemployment and inequality, particularly in case of low level 
domestic and foreign investments, as it is the case today in BiH.
4 
Another questions related with this section are analyzed in Annex 
A5. 
4.2 BIH Economic internal equilibrium assessment. Exactly, as the 
theory presupposes, the BH recent deflationary policies have resulted 
in relatively maintained macroeconomic stability and low inflation, 
but also in flattering growth rates and increased unemployment, 
reflecting extremely high social costs of maintaining the regime. 
Thus the constraint the regime imposes on public finances seriously 
impedes effective policy and program off setting of those social 
costs. The positive stabilization and political merits of the regime 
turned into serious negative repercussions. These imbalances and 
economic structural deficiencies prevents embarking form the 
performance contraction, thus threatening the regime’s sustainability. 
The BiH main internal economic indicators suggest outstanding 
disequilibria and minimum capacity utilization which pose certain 
worries on both regime sustainability and regime’s justifiability in 
the medium and long term.   
4.2.1.Growth performance. The remarkably growing economy 
reflected in high growth rates right in the aftermath of Dayton 
Accord, was a byproduct of the low base economic performance 
because of the war, as well as fuelled post-war reconstruction aid. 
The real GDP growth rates were 24, 13 and 10 per cent for the years 
1997,1998 and 1999 respectively. 
5 Notwithstanding the growth 
performance, BiH has not moved significantly closer to sustainable 
development path. The spurt of growth in the second half of the 
1990s is now faltering, with the average real GDP growth rate of 
                                                 
4 Source: CBBH (estimated Foreign Investment for 2002 was KM 300 mill.) 
5 CBBH: see also table 1, p. 12 of this report 
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below 5 % for the last three years.
6 Only in the last years, growth rate 
declined from 5.5% in 2000 to 4.5% in 2001 and at 3.5% for 2003. 
Initial growth projections for the last three years turned out to be 
over-optimistic, and, unfortunately, currently available indicators 
suggest a steady fall in annual GDP growth (See table 1 and chart 
1a,1b below). The GDP in 2003 amounted to about € 6.2 billion, 
while GDP per capita, measured on the basis of purchasing power 
parity, remains among the lowest in the region at around € 1,900. 
2004 estimated GDP is still below half its pre-war level, and it is 
expected that the pre-war GDP level may be reached only by 2010, 
thus stipulated by the best case scenario.
7  
 
Figure 1. Real Gdp growth rate in BiH 














    
 
Despite, the clear evidence of vigorous economic activity outside the 
legal system
8, the growth performance is indeed worrying. Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper projects that BH macroeconomic and 
financial sustainability is dependent upon its ability to grow at the 
minimum average rate of 5%, attract foreign investments in the 
                                                 
6 CBBH 
7 Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) BIH, Chapter on Macroeconomic 
framework and analysis, (the document has no page indication) 
8 It is estimated that if informal sources of value creation and income are 
taken into account (non-registered transfers by BH citizens from abroad, 
undeclared company revenues, non-recorded micro-firms and employee 
income, smuggling, tax evasion etc) the level of GDP could rise by 20% 
(the estimated size of the informal economy).  
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minimum value of 9% to GDP (from today’s 3%), increase its 
savings by seven times, and reduce trade deficit by achieving an 
average export growth rate of 15% and a decline in imports by 
averaging 5 % over the medium term period (2004-2007).
 9  
Unfortunately, this scenario seems overoptimistic if compared to 
2004 performance estimates of for instance GDP nominal growth 
rate of below 3 percent (CBBH). 
 
Figure 2. Real Gdp per capita in BiH 












 Source -Charts 1&2 : Central Bank Of Bosnia and Hercegovina (CBBH) 
Form the above illustration of economic performance it seems 
obvious that the currency board regime has induced severe output 
contraction. Continued adherence to this policy would further result 
in recessionary fluctuations. The costs of keeping the regime had 
already become too high and unjustifiably, bearing high risk of loss 
of confidence in the regime. Thus even worrying indicators which 
clearly reveal the true problems are those of rising unemployment 
and poverty.  However, the REER depreciation does not seem 
temporary as BiH economy has not reached its external balance and 
thus, has extremely low level of private capital inflows. This 
situation and respective future prospects are indicative of continuing 
deflationary policy and, in fact, further employment of fiscal 
restriction measures, with inevitably reverse effect on the economic 
                                                 
9 BH PRSP; Macroeconomic and Fiscal framework (MFF) 
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growth potential. Thus, these policies reveal an extremely high social 
costs, rising unemployment and inequality, particularly in case of 
low level domestic and foreign investments, as it is the case today in 
BiH.
10  
4.2.2 Unemployment and Poverty. Eventually as noted earlier, poor 
growth performance of BH coincides with even more worrying 
socio-economic indicators i.e. unemployment and poverty. The level 
of unemployed is outstandingly high. The number of people living in 
poverty is the highest in the region and according to the Living 
Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS), the poverty incidence is 
estimated at 20,5%, with estimated poverty levels of 25 % in RS and 
16% in FBH.  A more detailed analysis of these questions is 
presented in Annex A6. 
4.2.3. Fiscal Account imbalances: Public Finances and Public Debt 
Public Finance. The financial position of the government authorities 
represents a critical constraint on economic policy; and this 
constraint is rigidly enforced by the currency board principle, as 
noted earlier. The BiH authorities, taken as a whole, are only able to 
spend what they receive either from taxation or from donors. 
Eventually, improving economic performance (achieving greater 
growth rates) and improved fiscal management i.e. tax collection, 
represent the only viable source of increased government revenues. 
In other words, strengthening public sector finances is complicated 
by two major tax reductions (or constraints) being posed by 
international community for the reasons of economic efficiency: on 
import tariffs (and, in particular, import tariffs and duties exemption 
due to free trade agreements); and on wage-related taxes and social 
security contributions.
11  
Public Debt. Due to outstanding financial aid-dependency and high 
external vulnerability, the external debt had been progressively 
accumulating during the reconstruction period. In the year 2002 the 
public debt has reached its peak at the level of over 66% to GDP.  
Since than, the external financial assistance has decreased sharply in 
order to reverse the trend and curb threatened debt and fiscal 
                                                 
10 Source: CBBH (estimated level of Foreign Investment for the year 2002 
was KM 300 million) 
11 PEIR Study, World Bank, 2002, WB, BH 
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sustainability of the country. Following the year 2002 some of the 
outstanding debt was restructured and even dropped. Subsequently 
the total level of outstanding external debt in the 2004 is estimated at 
36% of GDP.  In addition, today the eternal debt is rather sustainable 
representing about 110% of exports with relatively low debt 
servicing to export ratio of 8%, due to favorable rather concessionary 
composition of external debt. In the Annex A7 a complementary 
analysis of this section is presented. 
4.2.4 Banking Sector. Banking sector in BiH is rather stable posing 
no direct, or say minim risk to potential systematic liquidity crises. 
This is primarily due to the sector’s successful transformation, rather 
the respective allowance of foreign banks predominance as well as 
strict regulation of the banking sector. The foremost international 
character of the banking sector contributes to sectors relatively easy 
access to foreign money markets via their mother companies, which 
in return, compensates for tight money market liquidity owed to 
monetary operation restrictions the regime imposes on the central 
bank. Further, the strict regulation of the sector reflected in relatively 
high rate of minimum reserve requirements of 10%, as well as 
introduction of tight liquidity trigger points of 100% and 95% 
backing of short-term liabilities, for 90 day and 180 days deposits 
respectively. Thus, the minimum risk capital adequacy ratio (net 
capital/risk weighted asset) is 12%. Since short terms deposits 
constitute 90% of all bank deposits, this however, implies that banks 
need to assure backing of almost all their liabilities with liquid assets. 
Indeed, the strict regulation imposes thigh liquidity conditions within 
the market. Eventually the interest rate remains high with average 
interest rate of 11% for the last year. Thus the average country risk 
rate is approximated at 3%. Thus, the structure of credit portfolio 
clearly indicated that the banking sector is not instrument to spur 
private sector growth but rather consumption. Above 60% of credit 
portfolio is consumer related crediting.  
12 
 4.3 External account Balance.  
4.3.1 Current Account and Trade deficit. The enormous surge in 
imports immediately after the introduction of the regime remains 
persistently high through the whole period. In fact, high volumes of 
                                                 
12 Data Source: CBBH. CBBH Statistical Bulleting 2003. 
 60Silajdzic, S.     The Currency Board Trap: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
imports reaching the incredible level of 75% of GDP in the year 
2000, remain relatively unchanged averaging to above 70% since the 
currency board introduction. (Source:CBBH). On the other side the 
level of exports remains marginal, with only slight increase of 4% 
since the 2001. Subsequently, the trade deficit average is over 60% 
to GDP in the same period. (Source:CBBH). Current account deficit 
remains at 29% to GDP in the 2003. These, impressive figures, 
indeed, are beyond any conventional wisdom regarding external 
capital flows. On the contrary, they reasonably pose question on 
currency board sustainability over the medium term.  Thus, the 
relative growth in money supply is due persistently high aid flows 
and external financing of twin deficits. In regard, if we look at the 
moneys supply chart below, it is evident that meaninglessly the 
money supply has been increasing, with a sudden enormous increase 
during the 2000/2001 period. However, it is worth noting that this 
increase is not due to positive BoP balances in the period, but rather 
due to the change in anchor currency form DM to EURO, and the 
respective conversion of non-registered DM by domestic population. 
The, change in anchor currency was necessary due to the 
establishment of the European Currency and Monetary Union. 
However, according to the CBBH estimates the estimated 
international reserve and money supply level for the year 2004 
indicate slight decrease of about 3%. . However, this is an indication 
that the trend has already been changing with risk of further decrease 
over the medium, as financial aid assistance is solely but surely 
wiping out. Yet, this is exactly the major threat to the regime 
sustainability. Nonetheless, these remarkably high deficits reached 
by BH economy are well beyond any figure of other comparable 
country, i.e. Estonia, Bulgaria, and Lithuania, with for instance, 
Estonia reaching the highest current account deficit of 9% to GDP in 
the 2001.
13 In accordance to the intertemporal approach of the 
current account deficits, chronic CA deficits shall not immediately 
impose an alarming signal to country competitiveness and external 
balance. Economic transformation implies necessary rebuilding of 
capital stock accumulation, and is reasonably associated with higher 
                                                 
13 Grunter  (2002) 
 
 61International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies   Vol.2-2 (2005) 
 
current account deficits. These assumptions are indeed reasonable, 
provided that capital inflows are used to finance capital accumulation 
rather than consumption. In reasonable time-frame, thus, the 
changing pattern of trade and respective current account shall 
become evident.  
 
Table 1.  
Balance of Payments          1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Gross Official Reserves            
Millions of US Dollars  472 482  1234  1187  1604 
In Months of Imports of  
goods and services   1,3 1,4 3,4 3,0 3,4 
Current Account Balance           
Millions of US Dollars  -1099 -883 -1216 -1753 -2095
As a percentage of GDP  -22,4 -18,6 -24,3 -30,9 -29,6 
Trade Balance 
4)       
Millions of US Dollars  -3300 -2627 -2958 -3341 -3926
As a percentage of GDP  -67,3 -55,4 -59,0 -59,2 -58,7 
 
Unfortunately, the persistence of extraordinary high deficits through 
out the 8 years period in Bosnia is not accompanied by the respective 
changes in economic fundamentals. This reasonably may be reflected 
in missing substantial increase of private capital inflows, and FDI 
flows into productive sector in particular. On the contrary, capital 
inflows were rather official in nature and by and large invested by 
(public) sector, and financial inflows were used to finance 
consumption rather than private and industrial sector restructuring, 
indicative by import structure (Imports of consumables is above 
75%). The substantial capital stock accumulation has not occurred 
neither if looking at trivial growth in productivity and industrial 
capital accumulation, or capital share in import structure, which is 
below 5%.   
The two critical issues are the trade deficit and money supply. The 
trade deficit could no longer be offset by import tariffs and/or export 
subsidization due to bilateral free trade arrangements and fiscal 
constraints.; Second, the incoming pressure on monetary reserves 
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might only be improved via special support facility i.e. in the form of 
a fund financed by donors to provide balance of payments and fiscal 
support in the case of crisis. It is clear the external imbalances would 
hardly be sustainable over the medium term, even, provided that the 
negative trend in foreign private capital inflows suddenly changes.  
The change and reverse capital inflows trend would need to be 
radical with FDI flows increase for about four times
14 the current 
level as to compensate for decreasing official financial assistance 
over the medium term. In conclusion, persistent external imbalances 
would soon no longer be atinable, seriously threatening the 
sustainability of the regime. Figures A3 and A4 are included in the 
Annex A9. 
 
5. Concluding remarks on the currency board trap 
Indeed, the Currency Board has been the right policy for the period 
of Bosnian post-conflict rebuilding, period of political reconciliation 
and major reconstruction. It has brought stabilization and confidence 
and perhaps insulated the country from political and economic risks 
associated with monetary discretion within highly decentralized state 
structures. However, it seems clear that the positive trends related to 
essential merits of the regime have turned into high socio-economic 
costs, thus posing serious risk to the regime sustainability over the 
medium term period. Indeed, the essential problem lies in economic 
fundamentals, economies structure and non-diversified industrial 
structure, in particular. Thus the privatization is at slow pace, 
initially due to disastrous massive privatization model, but 
concurrently also due to high insolvency incidence and diverse 
public companies deficiencies such as labor issues, thus making 
those companies unattractive to foreign investors. Passive trade 
liberalization with no industrial or private sector restructuring 
policies envisaged prior to opening up of markets resulted in non-
significant capital stock accumulation and industrial sector 
restructuring. This is evident from marginal private sector 
contribution to GDP of 36%.
15  The economic slowdown and risk of 
recession pose a reasonable threat to currency board sustainability.  
                                                 
14 PRSP Macroeconomic Framework, Projections: www.prsp.info 
15 BH Statistical Office 
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Thus, envisaged further reduction in public spending as to sustain 
fiscal policy imbalances, are only beginning to have pro-recessionary 
effect on the economy.  In case of GDP contraction, the debt/GDP 
would inevitably increase to sustain the external imbalances, thus 
raising the risk premium because of incurred fiscal account 
imbalances. These effects would accumulate expectations and 
contribute to casting doubts on the sustainability of the currency 
board. The persistent slowdown in growth performance can not be 
regarded as temporary shock but rather structural problems the BiH 
economy faces.  
In conclusion, due to continual and incoming negative economic 
shocks associated with the currency board regime and its trap, it 
seems of essential importance that Bosnian policy makers, meaning 
International Financial Institutions and local authorities, do not 
hesitate to abandon the currency board before it is too late. People of 
this country have suffered a lot, and thus experiencing Argentinean 
fate would truly be unnecessary and unfair.  
 
References: 
Atish R.G., Annie-Marie G. and Holger C.W., (1998), “Currency Boards: 
The ultimate Fix?”, IMF Working Paper WP98/8 
  Balino, T.J.T., and Enoch, Ch. (1997),”Currency Board Arrangements 
Issues and Experiences”, IMF Occasional Paper 151. IMF, Washington DC.  
Grunter, F. J. (2002),”Currency Board and Debt Trap: Evidence from 
Argentina and evidence for Estonia”, Herriot-Watt University, UK 
Halpern L., C. Wyplosz, (1997) “Equilibrium Exchange Rates in transition 
economies”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol 44, 430-461 
 Ho C., “A survey of the institutional and operational aspects of modern –
day currency boards”, BIS, Paper, No 110, March 2002 
Roubini, Nouriel (2001b) “Should Argentina Dollarize or Float? The Pros 
and Cons of Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes and their Implications for 
Domestic and Foreign Debt Restructuring/Reduction”, New York 
University. 
Silajdzic (Basic), S.(2003), “The BH external debt sustainability: issues and 
controversies”, Faculty of Economics Sarajevo, BiH.  
Websites: www.cbbh.gov.ba www.prsp.info  
 
On line Annex at the journal website 
Journal published by the EAAEDS: http://www.usc.es/economet/eaa.htm 
 64Silajdzic, S.     The Currency Board Trap: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Annex  
 
A1.What is the currency board and how it operates?: Further 
questions 
Such limited margin for central bank policy discretion suggests that 
market forces solely determine the money supply mostly via 
endogenously induced changes in the international monetary 
reserves. This, in effect, means that the level of capital provided is by 
and large dependent upon the countries ability to attract long-term 
foreign capital inflows, as well as on its ability to retain it. The pure 
adherence to the regime’s prescribed rules, in return, shall serve as 
direct source of confidence in both exchange rate and banking sector 
stability, which is based on trust in monetary authorities. Even 
though, restrictions on currency and other central bank liabilities 
issuance, and the reserve-backing rule appear quite intrinsic to CB, in 
practice, most of the countries operating under the currency board, 
have introduced slight modifications to reflect local conditions or 
rather ease inherent monetary policy inflexibility. For instance, the 
Argentinean baking rule used to differ substantially form other 
currency board arrangements or better  “pure” currency board, in that 
it allowed that up to 1/3 of backing could be met with the US dollar 
denominated government debt.
16 This in turn implied that no more 
than 66% of base money needed to be backed with foreign assets. 
Similarly, the structure of foreign assets used as baking requirement 
differ form country to country, thus in effect implying grater or less 
restrictions regarding the definition and percentage of liquid asset 
share. As opposed to Argentinean or Brunei’s relatively flexible 
baking rule, the Lithuanian central bank backs 100% money base 
(M0) plus liquid central bank liabilities i.e. commercial banks and 
government deposits, securities and promissory notes issued by the 
bank. Notwithstanding the concurrent remarkable differences in 
operating regulations, Bosnian central bank, on the other extreme, is 
entitled to 100% backing of all central bank liabilities. Moreover, 
under the currency board regime just as under other forms of fixed 
regimes, interest rate and inflation convergence is crucial to avoid 
exchange rate and other policy misalignments. Thus, interest rates 
                                                 
16 Balino and Enoch. (1997), 1-2 
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play an essential role in facilitating this adjustment. As CB shall 
imply no exchange rate risk, the interest rate convergence with the 
anchor country becomes reasonable in due course. However the 
theory does not always reveal its self in real world. Since country 
risk constitutes the essential part of interest rate formulation, and 
since interest rate is rather determined by local factors and market 
adjustments, the convergence isn’t likely in countries with either 
grater country risk assigned or unfavorable local conditions such as 
i.e limited capital mobility, unfavorable capital flows, structural 
deficiencies etc. or number of these factors combined that build a 
risk premium into a domestic interest rates. Thus, it is also worth 
noting that country risk assessment as well as currency board 
sustainability assessment is subject to attitudes just as much to the 
institutional and legal arrangement of the currency board. This is 
why most of the countries operating under the currency board are 
experiencing difficulties in achieving better results in interest rate 
convergence. Similarly, extensive real exchange rate misalignments 
are common phenomenon due to huge inflation rate disparities 
between the pegged and the anchor country.  Also essential factors 
influencing convergences implicit in this structure are capital account 
mobility and terms of trade. Both, by and large influence the level of 
discrepancies and as well as dynamics of convergence. Importantly 
liberal capital and trade accounts shall theoretically induce 
convergence and minimize policy misalignments. However, this is 
not always the case because of persistent monetary disequilibria and 
unfavorable local markets conditions in domestic economies.  Thus, 
the liberalization may be counterproductive in case of outstanding 
dynamics of capital flows i.e. persistent huge capital inflows or 
outflows. In conclusion, the legal commitment and the stringency of 
currency issuance to maintain the parity and diverse monetary 
regulation restrictions, implicit in the laws and acts establishing the 
arrangement, represent the essential features that distinguishes a 
currency board arrangement form other forms of fixed exchange rate 
arrangements. Such outstanding rigidity imposed by the regime is 
exactly the basis of the regimes credibility and subsequently the 
source of diverse advantages derived from this distinctive rule-based 
feature, such as the essential merits of increased or regained 
confidence in monetary authorities. Other succeeding advantages are 
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often assigned to i.e. established macroeconomic stability, low 
inflation, increased investments and foreign capital inflows, high 
growth performance. More importantly, the core merit of the 
currency board system is reflected in certain guarantees of the way it 
operates and maintaining exchange rate parity in particular. Thus, 
any deviation from rigid legal framework establishing the currency 
board may be seen as counter-effective to the merits assigned. For 
illustration, the currency board credibility may be discredited by a 
legal framework, which allows scope for i.e. either issuance of 
unbacked monetary liabilities or changing the currency peg either by 
currency revaluation or devaluation such as it is or has been the case 
in most currency board countries with the exceptions of Bosnia and 
Bulgaria. . In other words, if legal framework allows for such policy 
options envisaging disobedience of the legal barrier to changing the 
exchange rate, and attendant legal restrictions on the use other policy 
tools would seriously harm currency board credibility, this increasing 
the risk of regime’s sustainability. In addition, to strong commitment 
to maintain exchange rate parity and the resulting monetary policy 
restrictions, the currency boards impose stringent discipline on fiscal 
authorities, as it eliminates monetary financing of fiscal deficits, in 
effect restraining government’s form running budget deficit.   
However, in spite of intrinsic rules rather than discretion of currency 
board regime, in reality the regime’s regulative picture is not always 
unambiguous. Often, central banks face trade-offs between discretion 
and credibility as sometimes, stringent rules may raise high policy 
risks such as financial sector fragility or external vulnerability, which 
would be discussed later in the document. Notwithstanding the 
rigidities imposed by the currency board regime, it is worth noting 
that certain policy restrictions implicit in currency board 
arrangements are not unlike those of conventional central banks, and 
those who opted for pegged exchange rate regimes, in particular. 
 
A2. Why opt for currency board arrangement? Further questions 
The interest rate adjustment that occurs irrelevant of its degree of 
convergence, is primarily due to the increased credibility and 
confidence in the countries macroeconomic stability, and most 
importantly intrinsic and continued efforts to enhance banking sector 
stability. Sound banking sector, and presence of international banks 
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with their access to liquidity sources in an international arena, is 
considered essential under the currency board regime due to the 
restricted policy options of credit and LOLR provisions, particularly 
important for preventing systematic liquidity crisis. Increased 
investors confidence should rather result in increased financial 
intermediation and broad money. Yet, generally speaking currency 
boards are often perceived as less vulnerable to destabilizing capital 
outflows thanks to rigidity of backing and other attendant rules 
imposed. The reasons for opting a currency board as opposed to 
other forms of fixed exchange rate arrangements are numerous and 
disputable, thus varying on a case to case basis. Notwithstanding 
these contingency factors, countries opt for currency board as 
opposed to other fixed parity regime mainly due to one or more of 
the following reasons: a) in case of persistent high(per)-inflation and 
disastrous inflationary-spiral effects often combined with series of 
failed stabilization programs implemented (such as the case of 
Argentina), but also in case of investors’ loss of confidence and 
reduced monetary capacities such the case of Hong Kong with its 
aim to regain investors confidence in financial and money market 
after the 1982 currency crisis)-in both cases currency board serve as 
arrangements for countries willing to regain confidence in monetary 
policy; b) in case of difficult transition period (Estonia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria)and/or inherent lack of institutional capacity and experience 
with complex monetary policy frameworks; c) often as permanent 
solutions, in case of countries willingness to preserve the benefits of 
belonging to common currency area under the optimal currency area 
considerations and/or formally joining that area (i.e. Estonia, 
Bulgaria); d)  may serve as useful transitional arrangements for 
countries with no/limited central bank tradition and capacities due to 
the regime’s operational simplicity, as well as in case of poorly 
developed financial market (i.e. Caribbean countries); e) or   
alternatively may be best suited in case in which political 
constituency or processes do not allow for central bank independence 
despite the strong commitment to fiscal discipline, as monetary 
policy may be perceived as an effective tool of political rivalry, thus 
having severe consequences on economic stability, i.e. some post-
conflict countries-the argument is valid also in case of Bosnia. The 
adoption of currency board regime is by no means a clear-cut 
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decision as often argued. On the contrary, the success or failure of 
currency board option is rigorously determined by the specificities of 
broader economic, structural and institutional set of characteristics 
and arrangements but is also dependent upon attitudes of both local 
and international players. 
 
A3. What are the weaknesses and costs of the currency board 
regime? Further questions. 
The real appreciation is primarily due to high capital inflows as well 
as domestic economy structural adjustments resulting in inflations 
rates persistently higher than in anchor country. This was the case of 
almost all currency board countries i.e. Argentina, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria with notable exception of Bosnia. Price 
fluctuations are exactly the reason why liberalization of markets and 
labor market, in particular, becomes an essential mechanism for 
smooth and endogenous market and price adjustments, and tool to 
curb high real exchange rate fluctuations. Despite, the experience 
shows that real exchange rate misalignments incur, because Real 
Effective Exchange Rate (REER) is determined by real and 
fundamental variables of macroeconomic internal and external 
balance. In this regard, the real costs of the regime may incur at the 
time of real exchange rate corrections, and in those countries aiming 
to achieve real depreciation, in particular. The correction of real 
appreciation would imply a prolonged period of tight liquidity and 
high unemployment rates. Even more so in case of asymmetric 
macroeconomic policies opted by the anchor country for the 
respective period e.g. restrictive and inflation targeting policies, as 
well as in case of constrained capacity of domestic country tradable 
sector. In other words, countries with predominant no-tradable sector 
are particularly vulnerable as vast majority of domestic goods and 
service cannot be traded and therefore isn’t source of significant 
external capital inflows. In conclusion, the real exchange 
appreciation is less problematic if it is caused by initial 
undervaluation of the currency or increased productivity in the 
tradable sector (Balassa-Samuelson Effect) since it shall be a 
temporary in both cases. On the other side, if real appreciation is due 
to huge capital inflows in non-productive sector of the economy and 
subsequent increasing consumption, that in return do not have 
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positive long terms effects on the economy and its increased 
productive capacities, but would only crate a temporary consumption 
bubble, thus leaving structural and liquidity deficiencies at the time 
of the reverse trend. Such reverse trend and succeeding output 
contraction may cast doubt about the regime sustainability. It seems 
that the Bosnia is unfortunately the éclat ant example of the latter, 
meaning missed opportunities of capital stock accumulation and 
increased capacities at the time of huge capital inflows. However, the 
causes and the degree of misalignment of REER fluctuations are both 
difficult to determine as well as quantify.  As a consequence, 
reasonable assumption in regard to local factors that induce exchange 
rate adjustments via price changes, need careful consideration. 
Secondly, the previously elaborated merit of promoted fiscal 
discipline, reflected primarily in purged monetary financing of 
budget deficit, can indeed be considered as major weakness 
depending on initial country circumstances and soundness of 
respective fiscal policy objectives. Eventually, the constraints the 
regime imposes on fiscal accounts may come at odds with growth 
and development objectives at the time of fiscal consolidation, in 
particular.  Thus, this argument is more relevant for countries with 
limited capacity of economy’s real sector and/or poor revenue 
collection. The risk associated with fiscal policy constraints may be 
seen in government alternative choice to use external debt as source 
of budget deficit financing. Subsequently, problems associated with 
poor and bad external debt management, may result in public debt 
accumulation and payment arrears due to non-accommodated 
fluctuations in treasury management. Eventual casting of doubts on 
external debt management and its financing my incur loss of 
credibility in the regime and its sustainability. This scenario implies 
risk of self-fulfilling crisis and exchange rate attacks. The solution to 
this problem looks as if easy and clear cut from a theoretical 
perspective- pursue sound fiscal policies and create surplus to 
accumulate international reserves, reducing country’s dependence on 
foreign savings. However, in real world fiscal restrictions seem 
peculiar with most developmental policy objectives of transforming 
economies, paradoxically of those that come as the potential 
candidates for currency board adoption, with the exception of Hong 
Kong. Final but not least regime’s main weakness of restricted 
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LOLR function has, absurdly been conceived as on of the essential 
merits. The major argument in favor of merits induced via restricted 
LOLR function stems from the perception that the posed lending 
constraints on monetary authorities shall induce sound behavior of 
monetary authorities and banking sector authorities, thus, in effect, 
promoting stability within the markets. However, this is only 
partially true since credibility is determined by institutional and legal 
arrangements as much as by local attitudes and individual 
perceptions, local capacities and institutional knowledge, which may 
induce sound credit and finance related practices. Thus, ironically, 
the fact that the central bank is deprived form its main rescue policy 
option may induce loss of credibility at the banking sector at the 
times temporary instabilities or persistent policy misalignments, 
leading to disastrous effects. Furthermore, considering empirics of 
self-fulfilling financial crisis it seem obvious that the individual 
behavior has much less to do with circumstantial objective reasoning,  
but much more with pure psychological reactions inducing panic and 
risk-averse behavior- the contingency effect. Therefore, the historical 
record of both fiscal and monetary authorities’ behavior as well as 
individual experience and perception of crisis becomes essential 
determinant of dimension of such counterproductive behavior, in 
cases of even minor individual bank liquidity crisis. This becomes an 
important consideration  However, more important weakness 
associated to restricted LORL function is not that much of unsound 
banking sector behavior and the subsequent risk of systematic 
banking crises
17, as it is its intrinsic weakness of inability to 
influence capital market conditions and its dynamics. This is 
particularly important for CBA that are totally restrained from 
performing monetary operations. Thus if economic performance is 
largely dictated by capital flows and interest rate arbitrage it in fact 
may be subject to unnecessary (downward) fluctuations or even 
longer output contractions.  
                                                 
17 Proper behavior may effectively be induced by comprehensive  legal and 
institutional regulation of the banking sector, i.e. comprehensive regulation 
of bank risk exposure via liquidity ration, minimum required reserve ratio, 
capital asset ration, minimum capital adequacy ratio 
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A4. Evolution of inflation, NEER and REER 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of inflation in BiH 























      Figure A2. Evolution of NEER and REER in BiH 
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A5. Is this depreciation threatening the sustainability of Currency 
Board? The answer to this question is not a clear cut. If, the  REER 
depreciation of about 4% points is solely perceived as the actual 
correctness of exchange rate misalignment incurred during the 
immediate reconstruction phase, than the answer is no. On the other 
side the prompt answer lies in an assessment of economy’s 
movement toward its internal and external equilibrium or away from 
it? In other words, if economy continues to experience negative 
economic movements, reflected in flattering growth rates, rising 
unemployment, and current account deficits than this trend, however, 
may pose serious threat to currency board sustainability. In addition, 
the relevant question than becomes the one on relevance of socio-
economic costs incurring because of the continued adherence to 
currency board option, and not exclusively the one of threatened 
sustainability.  
The real appreciation option?A probably more attractive option of 
pursuing REER appreciation, highly depends on the BiH external 
debt position and its ability to borrow internationally and/or attract 
substantial inflows of foreign private capital. In general, the 
overvaluation option is at the best temporary solution, and, thus, is 
only viable to the extent the country is able to borrow internationally 
to finance its balance of payments deficits, or at best as long as 
current account deficits are financed through FDIs indicating an 
economies move to its external equilibrium. Since, in Bosnia current 
account deficit is financed through aid flows, with marginal private 
capital inflows and, in fact, trivial level of FDIs attractions; (FDI 
volume remains below 3% of GDP.
18 ), and the only relevant issue 
becomes its ability to further borrowing. This option, however, does 
not seem viable considering that external/international financing are 
declining and already problematic level of public debt, reflected in 
the following indicators (see Basic(2003): debt to GDP ratio equals 
55%, and debt to export ratio being 125% (EDT/GDP and 
EDT/XGS), as well as BH’s assigned Sovereign Country rating of 
                                                 
18 CBBH 
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“B3” 
19. Moreover, creditors’ reluctance to further lending will be 
and are greatly increasing if creditors see the country’s debt servicing 
capacity as being compromised by the institutional arrangements of 
an exchange rate. Considering the current circumstances restrictive 
policies seems the only feasible option under the currency board. 
Otherwise the exchange rate would become increasingly overvalued; 
which in Bosnian case could hardly be sustainable due to its 
persistent imbalances. Thus, it would make exports and import-
substituting domestic industries even less competitive. In other 
words, the second option of allowing further overvaluation of 
currency seems hardly a viable alternative.   
 
A6. Unemployment and Poverty. Eventually as noted earlier, poor 
growth performance of BH coincides with even more worrying 
socio-economic indicators i.e. unemployment and poverty. The level 
of unemployed is outstandingly high. The average level of 
unemployment in BiH is estimated at about 42%, and has remained 
at about that level throughout the whole of post war period with 
some slight increase. These figures suggest that the private sector 
growth is rather at a slow pace, incapable of absorbing the increasing 
army of the unemployed. In Federation, the privatization process and 
the accompanied downsizing is greater in absolute numbers than the 
private sector growth and new job creation. In RS the opposite is 
truth, due to much slower dynamic of the privatization processes. In 
short, the recent trends of the transition process in BH indicate 
greater value destruction than value creation.  Eventually, most 
Bosnians are getting poorer, particularly in Republika Srpska. There 
is clearly indication of high level of income inequality as well as 
poverty. Most people in both Entities are living far below the 
“substance” level (minimum level necessary to satisfy and meet 
basic human/living needs i.e. food, shelter, health protection, 
education etc). The average monthly wage in Federation amounted to 
EUR 260 in 2003. But the basket of typical consumables needed to 
                                                 
19 Sovereign rating is an assessment of borrower’s likelihood to default on 
its obligations, Rating B3 assigned to BH by the Moody’s company for 
internationally ratings (Feb,2004) is the lowest sovereign rating, indicating 
high risk obligations. 
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keep a family of four costs EUR 240. The corresponding average 
growth rates of the two variables indicate no raise in real average 
living standard from 2001 onwards. The number of people living in 
poverty is the highest in the region and according to the Living 
Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS), the poverty incidence is 
estimated at 20,5%, with estimated poverty levels of 25 % in RS and 
16% in FBH.  In addition, more than 30 % of population falls under 
the highly vulnerable category and are living just above the poverty 
line.
20 According to the LSMS survey the poverty line is estimated at 
the level of annual income below 1850 KM, whereas according to 
the same source, the highly vulnerable category is considered to 
receive an annual income of just above the defined poverty threshold 
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Federation of BiH Republic of Srpska 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Source:CBBH 
The shortfall is even more striking in RS, where the average monthly 
wage was EUR 200 in 2003, but the basket of essential items cost 
EUR240. As noted above, the fact is that the picture is even bleaker 
than those averages indicate, given that 46 per cent of Federation’s 
                                                 
20 BiH Medium Term Development Strategy - PRSP (2004-2007), p. 21-22. 
Again, it would be worth adding what the poverty line is in this para. 
21 Living Standard Measurement Survey, Zavod za Statistiku BH, 2001, BH 
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population and 75 per cent of those in the RS cannot afford this 
notional basket of goods and foodstuffs.
22 
 
A7.  Fiscal Account imbalances: Public Finances and Public Debt. 
Further questions. 
Public Finance. The financial position of the government authorities 
represents a critical constraint on economic policy; and this 
constraint is rigidly enforced by the currency board principle, as 
noted earlier. The BiH authorities, taken as a whole, are only able to 
spend what they receive either from taxation or from donors. 
Eventually, improving economic performance (achieving greater 
growth rates) and improved fiscal management i.e. tax collection, 
represent the only viable source of increased government revenues. 
In other words, strengthening public sector finances is complicated 
by two major tax reductions (or constraints) being posed by 
international community for the reasons of economic efficiency: on 
import tariffs (and, in particular, import tariffs and duties exemption 
due to free trade agreements); and on wage-related taxes and social 
security contributions.
23 Because of the currency board arrangement, 
any reduction in revenues from these sources would lead directly into 
lower government expenditures or into higher rates of taxes if not off 
set by higher growth rates; surge in investments and private sector 
growth. Since, BiH has little or no scope for any further increases in 
tax rates or base
24, the main burden of current and future fiscal 
adjustments falls on the public expenditure side. This would imply 
cuts in distributive policy spending; benefit transfers i.e. social 
security, unemployment etc.; health services and education in 
particular. The prevailing situation in terms of public management 
and spending in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not 
sustainable. The weight of the public sector as a whole, throughout 
all the institutions – state, entities, cantons, districts and 
municipalities – is extremely high by any standards. According to the 
                                                 
22 “Early warning system in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, UNDP Quarterly 
Report, October-December 2003 
23 PEIR Study, World Bank, 2002, WB, BH 
24 Reasonable assumption since direct tax rates are already relatively high 
and hardly sustainable averaging 20% in both entities, source: CBBH 
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World Bank data for the year 2002 in BiH, general government 
expenditures accounts for 60.7% of GDP compared to 49.2% in the 
EU (average) and 41.4% in transition CEE countries (average). In 
countries of former Yugoslavia like Croatia, Macedonia, and 
Slovenia, general government spending in 2000 was 51.3%, 36.6%, 
and 43.6% of GDP, respectively.
25 National economic output is 
insufficient to cover growing public expenses. The international 
financial assistance is still remarkable in volume terms although 
declining. According to the WB PEIR, the consolidated general 
government deficit in 2000, including capital spending, arrears, off-
budget defense spending, was equal to 11.2% of BiH’s GDP.
26. 
However, budget defict has been substantially reduced during the last 
two years to the estimated level of below 3% of GDP in 2004 
(CBBIH). Further reducing of fiscal imbalances would have negative 
repercussions on economy, society as a whole even income 
distribution in particular. This is obviously going to affect the more 
vulnerable groups of the population and those who rely more on 
social spending. Over-tight fiscal constraints represent an important 
obstacle to effective policy-making, effective administration and 
high quality public services. Thus it seriously impedes growth 
potentials. Because of the currency board arrangement, any reduction 
in revenues from these sources would lead directly into lower 
government expenditures or into higher rates of taxes if not off set by 
higher growth rates; surge in investments and private sector growth. 
Since, BiH has little or no scope for any further increases in tax rates 
or base
27, the main burden of current and future fiscal adjustments 
falls on the public expenditure side. This would imply cuts in 
distributive policy spending; benefit transfers i.e. social security, 
unemployment etc.; health services and education in particular. The 
prevailing situation in terms of public management and spending in 
particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not sustainable. 
                                                 
25 European Commission, 2003, Basic functional and financial audit of BH 
institutions-Draft, EC Commissioned Report, p. 4 
26 World Bank, 2002, PIER Study, WB, BH  
27 Reasonable assumption since direct tax rates are already relatively high 
and hardly sustainable averaging 20% in both entities, source: CBBH 
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Public Debt. Yet the public debt does not pose serious threat to 
currency board sustainability, but clearly external financing could for 
not too long be used as source of BoP deficit and fiscal account 
deficits financing, in particular. Posing sustainability on these 
accounts over the medium term would, and in fact, already has 
resulted in output depression. However, despite the relative 
stabilization of foreign debt accumulation the country remains donor-
dependent. The persistent donor dependency is revealed in a 
continuous foreign debt financing of both internal/fiscal and 
external/Balance of Payment (BoP) sustainability amounting to 
average of 12% of GDP for the last 4 years. In addition, the 
economies’ chronic inability to assure balanced financial/capital 
flows, reflected in chronic BoP deficits in spite of massive external 
donor funding, clearly assigns constrained economic capacity, and 
limited ability to increase export performance in particular. These 
suggest serious problems on the country’s external account balance. 
 
A8. The weight of the public sector as a whole, throughout all the 
institutions – state, entities, cantons, districts and municipalities – is 
extremely high by any standards. According to the World Bank data 
for the year 2002 in BiH, general government expenditures accounts 
for 60.7% of GDP compared to 49.2% in the EU (average) and 
41.4% in transition CEE countries (average). In countries of former 
Yugoslavia like Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia, general 
government spending in 2000 was 51.3%, 36.6%, and 43.6% of 
GDP, respectively.
28 National economic output is insufficient to 
cover growing public expenses. The international financial assistance 
is still remarkable in volume terms although declining. According to 
the WB PEIR, the consolidated general government deficit in 2000, 
including capital spending, arrears, off-budget defense spending, was 
equal to 11.2% of BiH’s GDP.
29. However, budget defict has been 
substantially reduced during the last two years to the estimated level 
of below 3% of GDP in 2004 (CBBIH). Further reducing of fiscal 
imbalances would have negative repercussions on economy, society 
                                                 
28 European Commission, 2003, Basic functional and financial audit of BH 
institutions-Draft, EC Commissioned Report, p. 4 
29 World Bank, 2002, PIER Study, WB, BH  
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as a whole even income distribution in particular. This is obviously 
going to affect the more vulnerable groups of the population and 
those who rely more on social spending. Over-tight fiscal constraints 
represent an important obstacle to effective policy-making, effective 
administration and high quality public services. Thus it seriously 
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